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The Gods Within: Chekhov, Lorca and Internalization of Tragic Fate
(all translations by the author)

"Tragedy," writes George Steiner in his Death of Tragedy, "is irreparable" (8).
If the reader or spectator can envision any sort of solution for a disaster – whether it
be through social or technical means – then it is not truly tragic. He points to
playwrights like Ibsen and Chekhov by way of example. The situations in which
their characters find themselves are indeed lamentable, but often it seems that all
would be set right if only debts were repaid or love interests requited. What
separates this sort of misfortune from actual tragedy is, according to Steiner, the
lack of fate or divine intervention. No remedies were available to the tragic heroes
of classical tragedy. The gods fated a particular destiny that was, without exception,
inescapable. No matter what immediate solution became apparent, nothing could
derail the course of fate. The most famous example of this is that of Oediupus, who
fell right into the arms of his tragic destiny – murdering his father and marrying his
mother - by trying to avoid it. By contrast, more modern "tragedies" have no divine
force driving the plot. Without gods, there is no fate, and certainly nothing that is
inescapable.
The majority of modern theater has a conspicuous lack of divine
intervention. Should we dismiss it outright as "almost, but not quite"? The
temptation to accept Steiner's contention is strong; many god-less plays, "revivals"
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of the classical style, have missed the mark in some way. The Romantics of the 19th
century sought to reach tragic ideal, in Steiner's view, but put too much of
themselves into their art. Where classical art "strives for [the] ideal of impersonality,
for the severance of the work from the contingency of the artist," Romanticism links
play and playwright inextricably (Steiner 139). The result is too egocentric to make
a truly tragic impact a large audience that may not be able to relate. Moreover,
Romantic "tragedies," though fiercely dramatic, ended on some sort of redemptive
note, reflecting "an age which did not believe in the finality of evil" (133). This is
precisely Steiner's point – a play can be as violent or heart-wrenching as it gets, but
if when all is said and done, if the loose ends are tied into a neat bow, it
undermines the essence of tragedy.
The Naturalists faced a similar fate in Steiner's view, though they never
meant to reach the same melodramatic intensity of the Romantics. They did not
directly intend to resurrect the classical forms, but its heavy subject matter makes
for an easy juxtaposition with Greek tragedy. Because Naturalist plays deal with
realistic, everyday situations where no powerful outside force exists, Steiner insists
that solutions can be found not just for the characters' problems, but for the
problems of the society that these characters represent. Ibsen and Strindberg's
sitting-room dramas, for instance, draw attention towards the issues of the middleclass, then "[summon] us to action in the conviction that truth of conduct can be
defined and that it will liberate society" (291). Their heroes may not triumph, but
they raise awareness of problems solvable problems. Steiner maintains that they are
personally responsible for their follies. Had they chosen to, they could have
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escaped their unfortunate ends. Where a solution exists, tragedy does not – "tragic"
does not necessarily imply "tragedy."
What is tragic will only reach the status of tragedy if fate is involved. Fate
cannot exist without gods. Thus, drama that lacks gods must also lack fate and, as
such, cannot be tragedy. Steiner's syllogism is convincing in its simplicity, but its
narrow scope may be its own downfall. Why must fate be dependent on the divine,
on a power outside of ourselves? The human mind is easily convinced, and
psychosomatic suggestion can lead to the most dire of self-fulfilling prophecies. I
would like to propose that Steiner's scope is too limited; fate is something that can
be created from within, and does not need to rely on the mandate of a supreme
being. The psychological impact on the characters of modern drama, whether it
stems from societal, political or cultural forces, is strong enough to act as fatecreator in a world where gods do not exist.
This paper will attempt to prove the continuation of fate into modern tragic
theater, using the plays of Chekhov (a Naturalist) and Lorca (a post-Romantic) as
representative examples. After setting up these authors in their proper cultural
contexts, I will examine their works against well-established definitions of tragedy,
both classical and modern. I will then closely analyze the internal workings of the
tragic heroes of these plays, ultimately demonstrating how they have managed to
create and fulfill their destinies, even in the absence of gods.
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Tragedy's Reality – The Lives of Chekhov and Lorca
One would be hard-pressed to find suitable comparisons between such
incongruent authors as Anton Chekhov and Federico García Lorca. Still, there are
several points on which at least their tragic inspirations converge. The two writers
seem to share an interesting muse – an embarrassing and ruinous secret. Chekhov's
denial of his terminal illness and Lorca's inability to come to terms with his
sexuality not only tint their respective works with incurable pessimism but create
for both a most curious parallel to the heroes of classical tragedy. In effect, they
exhibit real-life forms of the tragic flaw, a devastating and inescapable fact of
existence that would ultimately bring about their premature demise. These flaws
inspired dramatic pieces that are oddly similar in their psychological scope and the
way in which they demonstrate a shift away from God-created fate. It is clear that
each author, in his own distinct way, asked himself poignant questions about the
nature of fate, stemming perhaps from an understanding of his own tragic fate that
he could not avoid no matter how hard he tried to conceal it.
Anton Chekhov was born in 1860 in Taganrog, a small port town in
southern Russia. His short life, only fourty-four years, was a turbulent one and
rarely a source of comfort to him. As a child, he endured not only the sting of
poverty, but also the cruelty of an unloving family, large and full of corruption,
mental instability and the ravages of addiction. "Tyranny and lies crippled our
childhood so much," he once wrote to his brother, "that it makes me sick and afraid
to remember" (Rayfield 17). Chekhov's father, a deeply religious and disciplinary
man, beat his children regularly for even the slightest infractions. He insisted that
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Chekhov and his brothers join the choir at the Greek monastery, forcing them into
late-night and early-morning rehearsals, which he punctuated by thrashings (13). It
is perhaps unsurprising, then, that Chekhov's associations with Greek Orthodoxy –
and, consequently, religion on the whole – were so unpleasant. "When I recall my
childhood I now find it rather gloomy;" he lamented to a fellow writer in 1892, "I
now have no religion" (14).
It was apparent to Chekhov from an unsettlingly young age that that there
was a certain instability to his life, a lingering restlessness that would find its way
into his written works. His first sexual experience, for instance, a night at the local
brothel when he was thirteen years old, would set the stage for many future
misadventures with women (51). Though he was a handsome young man who was
never without interested parties, he remained incapable of sustaining a meaningful
relationship. He expressed dissatisfaction with his unending string of girlfriends and
fiancées, suggesting a need for the constant newness with which the brothels
supplied him. Chekhov used his career as a doctor to further satiate his lust,
routinely sleeping with the very prostitutes he examined for venereal diseases. As a
writer for various literary magazines, he would use his experiences of medical
examinations and autopsies as fodder for creative re-imaginings of this sordid
world.
After the loss of one of his brothers to alcoholism, and then again when he
was closer to his own death, he embarked on what he hoped would be an inspiring
journey across Siberia and into Europe, unwilling to chain himself to one place for
too long. Adding to his bevy of predicaments was a well-kept and fatal secret:
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Chekhov had tuberculosis, officially contracted from one of his patients sometime
in the 1880's, although he had been sickly and consumptive since childhood. As
many of his own friends and family succumbed to the same disease, he dutifully
concealed the severity of his condition. Likely experiencing his own fair share of
denial, he continued his debauchery for as long as he could manage, regularly
indulging in morphine or heroin to ease the pain of his speedy deterioration.
The 'sick doctor' device is not uncommon to Naturalist theater like
Chekhov's; playwrights such as Ibsen and Strindberg employed the character
recurrently. Naturalism in the arts frequently dealt with the theme of illness as a
greater social issue. Sickness in the plays of this genre was represented by a cloying
stench that permeated the membrane of the bourgeoisie, causing its fall and rotting
from within. The inclusion of a doctor who was just as unwell as those he was
meant to cure reinforced this social criticism. The role of a doctor is to diagnose; he
is a sort of omniscient character because he can pinpoint exactly what's wrong
with the other characters, both physically and mentally. But if a man of medicine
cannot even treat his own ailments, then what hope can there be for his patients? If
we extend the metaphor, we can surmise that the noble class is similarly doomed.
The fact that Chekhov was himself a terminally ill doctor could not have escaped
his keen sense of ironic fate. His realization of the irony inherent in his regrettable
situation must have perpetuated his pessimistic worldview and simultaneous
insistence that the plays he wrote were, in fact, comedies.
It is no wonder that Chekhov, surrounded by death, abuse and disease
throughout his life, cultivated an ironic tinge to his writing. His portrayal of

Nirenburg 7

bourgeois existence was disquieting: although his intention was to mock, he
instead incited profound sadness and pity. Chekhov even believed himself to be a
humorist; he was known as a biting satirist long before he began writing his bestknown works. The many pieces he had written for disreputable newspapers, some
under assumed names, had established him as a cutthroat and often vulgar writer.
Although he began to tackle quite serious psychological issues in his short fiction,
he could nevertheless "be sure of hiding behind a neutral, ironical authorial
persona" (127). Furthermore, the four plays that constitute his most established
theatrical oeuvre – The Seagull, Uncle Vanya, The Three Sisters and The Cherry
Orchard – were all meant to be satirical, if not outright comedic.
Despite Chekhov's delusions to the contrary, the intended comedy within
these major plays translates into tragic irony. The Seagull, for example, is "full of
cruel parody" and encapsulates "all the material of comedy," but leaves a troubling
void where happy resolution belongs – "age is unscathed, youth perishes, and the
servants sabotage the household" (353). Konstantin Stanislavsky, co-founder of the
Moscow Art Theater and producer of several of Chekhov's plays, noticed this
disparity. Expecting jovial farces from the playwright, he was troubled to find
instead The Three Sisters and The Cherry Orchard, the latter of which Chekhov had
labeled with the sub-heading 'comedy', just as he had done with The Seagull. "I
only fear that instead of a farce again we shall have a great big tragedy," the
director predicted of The Cherry Orchard, "Even now he thinks Three Sisters a very
merry little piece" (580). Surprisingly, "though it focuses on the destruction of a
family and their illusions," The Cherry Orchard was designed as a vaudeville (580).
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It was Chekhov's answer to Stanislavsky's displeasure with the overwhelming
sadness of The Three Sisters.
Like Chekhov, Federico García Lorca lived for only a very short time, from
1898 until the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Although he enjoyed
celebrity and his writing won commercial success, he nevertheless struggled with a
suicidal depression. Ian Gibson, a respected Lorca biographer, suggests that Lorca's
unhappiness was an unfortunate side-effect of trying to camouflage his
homosexuality. "The necessity of having to lead a double life in a society where
homosexuality was considered abhorrent," Gibson explains, "played a large part in
the poet's underlying sadness and, at times, despair" (xxi). But the problem
extended past the need for a public façade. Lorca was raised in an extremely
religious environment and maintained a strong connection to Catholicism into his
adult life. His attempts to reconcile his homosexuality with his religion were
agonizing, and certainly contributed to the development of his strange relationship
with God.
Although Lorca's complete devotion to Jesus and his teachings never waned,
he "had come to feel a passionate hatred for the Christian God" (65). He identified
with Jesus' suffering, but could not abide obeisance to a God who did not accept
all of His followers or who caused them so much pain. Lorca found an outlet for
his religious apprehensions in his writing, particularly in his tragic theater, where
he pitted his heroes against the cruel authority of nature or family - earthly
substitutes for God. Yerma, the heroine of the play of the same name, serves as an
apt example. A barren woman with a desperate desire to have children, she reflects
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the author's own frustrations. As a homosexual man in an intolerant culture, Lorca
was himself, effectively, sterile. No socially acceptable solution existed for either
Yerma or Lorca, both devout Catholics whose faith began to shatter when God's
absence became painfully clear.
Interestingly, both Chekhov and Lorca experienced the beginnings of
political upheaval in their respective countries. The political climates of Russia and
Spain, two rarely compared regions of the world, provide fascinating contextual
backdrops for the lives and works of these men. Both authors lived in the mounting
crescendo of citizen unrest. Because he died before the first Russian Revolution of
1905, Chekhov could not have known the complete reworking of society that
would follow, but he must have been well aware of the tensions that had been
building during his lifetime. Lorca was less fortunate, although he, too, did not
experience life under the new regime. At the very beginning of the Spanish Civil
War, he was shot by Falange militia at Franco's behest, most likely a punishment
for his homosexuality and heretical leanings. Chekhov and Lorca lived their lives
on the precipice of revolution; the overwhelming mood of instability could not
have escaped either their thoughts or their writings. Steiner mentions that important
periods of drama often "did coincide with periods of particular national energy"
(109); as members of quickly unraveling societies, Chekhov and Lorca processed
their countries' turmoil through their characters (many of whom I will discuss in a
later section of this essay). Chekhov's displaced nobility reflected the growing
obsolescence of the bourgeoisie, while Lorca's oppressed heroines mimed their
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real-life counterparts, an entire nation of people soon to be controlled by a deeply
religious government.
Chekhov and Lorca's religious concerns also contributed greatly to the
overall moods of their works. Chekhov's childhood experiences with Russian
Orthodoxy and ensuing physical deterioration may have done little for his piety,
but where he replaced faith-based questioning with outright cynicism, Lorca felt
the need to play out his doubts through his fiction, perhaps hoping to stumble upon
a solution for his torment. The acute need to harmonize his heretical beliefs with
his intense spiritual devotion guided Lorca through his artistic exploits. The paths
that these two authors took towards tragedy may have differed, but the resulting
works converged on a crucial point – we can no longer blame God for the fate that
we create ourselves.
In order to better understand these works and how they fit into the tragic
mold, we must define the goals of tragedy itself.

Classifying Tragedy – How Can Modern Notions of Tragedy Fit into Classical
Forms?
Tragedy is not defined simply by the presence of gods or fate – these
elements are present even in comedy, tragedy's opposite, and thus cannot be the
foundation on which tragedy rests, despite what Steiner might have us believe. The
need to separate dramatic forms into distinct categories and delineate their exact
necessary components was evident even while classical theater was still being
written. Two of the most prominent philosophers of tragedy, Aristotle and
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Nietzsche, have carefully elaborated their respective understandings of what real
tragedy must include. I hope to demonstrate how modern theater continues to
adhere to their rubrics.
Aristotle explains in his Poetics that tragedy has "ceased to evolve" (Halliwell
35). After generations of poets had made their slight alterations and improvements,
the genre "attained its natural fulfillment," leaving no room for further modification.
Agreeing with Aristotle would not only mean accepting Sophocles and Euripides as
the epitome of tragic ideal, but also granting them the dubious status of 'Last
Tragedians.' If tragedy's development ended with these men, how must we
categorize the tragic drama written since the 5th century BCE? Do these plays
overflow the confines of tragedy, or can we allow for malleable borders in order to
accommodate contextual changes? To answer these questions, we must define
these borders, an endeavor that cannot be tackled without a thorough
understanding of Aristotle's own requirements for tragedy.
According to Aristotle, tragedy is made up of six crucial components that
"make it what it is": plot structure, character, thought, style, lyric poetry and
spectacle (37). Of these, the most important by far is plot structure, the ultimate
goal of tragedy, "because tragedy is a representation not of people as such but of
actions and life." Characterization is of second importance, as it exists only insofar
as it moves along the plot. The rest of the elements decrease in consequence
following the aforementioned order. Thought refers to the characters' ability to
argue convincingly. Style and lyric poetry describe verbal expression as well as
vocal rhythm and melody of the characters' speech, respectively. Spectacle, the last
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of the six elements, "is the least integral of all to the poet's art: for the potential of
tragedy does not depend upon public performance of the actors" (39). We will
confine our discussion primarily to those elements that do not deal with the
structure language, as Aristotle's ruminations on the subject were limited to the
linguistic parameters of Attic Greek. This leaves us with plot and characterization,
luckily the most relevant themes of the Poetics.
Undoubtedly the most significant of Aristotle's prerequisites for a good
tragedy are unity of action and arousal of pity and fear. Every component of his
tragic plot structure leans on the overarching need for unity. In order to be a
tragedy, a drama must follow a perfectly logical progression of events and be
encapsulated between a clear beginning, middle and end. Each distinct event must
have a precise purpose, "for anything whose presence or absence has no clear
effect cannot be counted an integral part of the whole," and must evoke both fear
and pity in the audience (40). Ideally, a tragedy should also involve recognition (a
change from a state of ignorance into a state of knowledge) and reversal (a
surprising and often ironic plot twist), both of which, if executed properly and in
conjunction with each other, will actually produce pity and fear. Although Aristotle
outlines several types of recognition, he asserts that the best kind will arise out of
the emotional impact of the events themselves. A drama in which the unity of all
these elements cannot be disturbed for fear of collapsing the whole is at the core of
the tragic ideal.
A tragedy may follow either a simple or complex plotline, although the latter
is highly preferable. A simple plot must, of course, be "continuous and unitary" as
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described above, but its transformation – that is, a change in status "from affliction
to prosperity, or the reverse" – need not arise from reversal or recognition (42). The
action of the complex plot does involve these things. Again, this speaks to the
importance of interwoven plot elements in tragedy; if a transformation occurs
without any particular reason, then the overall unity of the drama is marred. A
well-crafted tragedy should flow as naturally as possible from action to action,
leaving no effect without a cause.
Character portrayal is nearly as important as plot in its contribution to a
play's structural unity, as well as its ability to provoke, and then purge, fear and
pity in its audience. Just as plot cannot be superfluous in any way, the
characterization within an ideal tragedy must also be limited to necessity, "so that a
necessary or probable reason exists for a particular character's speech or action"
(48). This follows logically with Aristotle's previous points - a smooth plot
progression relies on the actions of its characters – but he adds several parameters
to which these individuals must adhere. He insists that the protagonist must be
ethically good, appropriate for his prescribed role and consistent in his nature (47).
This is not to say that the tragic hero must be even-tempered and pure, but "the
poet, while portraying men who are irascible or lazy or who have other such faults,
ought to give them, despite such traits, goodness of character" (48).
Naturally, the "fearful and pitiful events" that occur befall the characters,
particularly the hero, and must follow their own set of rules. A wholly good man
cannot fall from prosperity into affliction, as this would provoke pity and fear but
not purge them; neither should the plot tell the fall of a truly evil man; his fate
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would, in this case, be deserved, and "such a plot-structure… would not arouse
pity or fear" (44). Neither should an evil man move from affliction into prosperity,
as the consequences would not be "moving nor pitiful nor fearful" (44). Aristotle
correctly notes that very few options remain if these rules are put into effect, and
the resulting hero figure must exist on a middle ground between good and evil. His
fall into affliction is tragic, unlike the previous examples, "because of a certain
fallibility," – the hamartia, or tragic flaw - and not because of any inherent evil
(44). If the goal is to provoke a certain audience reaction, the hero must be
someone with whom the viewer can identify. A hero who comes to a tragic end
because of something he could have helped or because he deserved it will not win
pity from the viewer, whereas hamartia – a sad fact of a hero's life that in no way
reflects poorly on his character – is acceptable.
In brief, a perfectly unified Aristotelian tragedy begins with a complication
(the exposition and rising action that precedes a transformation), continues to the
point of recognition, which, in turn, creates the transformation from prosperity into
affliction, and proceeds after this point to the dénouement that comprises the
falling action of the play (51). Each section flows fluidly into the next, and although
a surprising turn of events is certainly integral, it must nevertheless be a logical turn,
an event that occurs as a direct result of previous events. The plot itself must be
complex, but single – a branching plotline would be too reminiscent of epic poetry.
As for characterization, Aristotle requires a sympathetic hero, as well as total
appropriateness of all other characters. In order to incite pity and fear, the hero
must be generally good and possess hamartia. To the Greek audience, this brand of
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bad luck would have made the protagonist pitiable, as it does not imply weakness
of character but rather a fate that he cannot control.
What makes a tragedy a tragedy? Would a play that fit all of Aristotle's rules
but one still be a tragic? This is not an issue that Aristotle addresses head-on, but
given his precision in delineating every aspect of a proper tragedy, it seems that the
philosopher himself would answer this question in the negative. Although he does
allow room for variation, there is no mistaking which type of tragedy Aristotle
deems superior. His assertion that tragedy has reached its structural pinnacle
seems to stifle any possibility of straying from his formula. Returning now to the
opening quandary, I would like to address this issue as it applies to modern
tragedy, that of Chekhov and Lorca in particular.
I contend that the overarching theme of Aristotle's guidelines is in fact quite
relevant to post-Classical theater, but that the particulars cannot fully extend into
the modern realm. Complete unity of action, for instance, the key to Aristotle's
principles, is present in both Chekhov's and Lorca's drama. The works of each
author, which will discuss at greater length in a later section of this essay, embody
a cohesive story line without diverging too drastically into subplots. Despite
radically different writing styles, their respective end results nonetheless fit this
portion of the Aristotelian mold. Lorca includes only what is essential to his theme
in order to advance his plots , by virtue of his simplicity and ardent symbolism. For
example, the macho and the hembra of Yerma's final act are archetypal
representations of pagan sexuality and the workings of nature as a whole. Because
he uses strongly recognizable symbols, Lorca has no need for over-explication or
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beating around the bush – his meaning is abundantly clear. Chekhov, although he
is comparatively verbose, fills each of his lines with deep significance. Even stage
directions and setting are absolutely crucial. The time of day and season of each
act of The Three Sisters, for example, reflect each act's mood; they signal not only
the passage of time, but the process of aging and embitterment.
What is important to note about this modern drama, however, is that its
unity of action is not harmonious in the way Aristotle would have wanted it to be.
Instead of fluid plot progression, these plays involve a certain amount of jarring,
almost forced development. Ancient tragedies certainly feel more "complete" than
any of Chekhov or Lorca's plays. Typically, classical tragedy leaves no possible
continuation to its narrative. The heroes meet their predestined fate head-on, the
gods make their appearance and, more often than not, the majority of the
characters meet their demise. The drama resolves itself logically and fluidly, with
no unanswered questions or room for further speculation. This is not entirely the
case with either Chekhov or Lorca, whose drama, although unified, fails to satisfy
on the same basic level. Yerma's decision to murder her husband is not
harmonious with the rest of the plot, even though it is logical. It is a disturbing final
moment that savagely severs all loose ends, leaving the viewer not with a sense of
justice or satisfaction from a lesson learned, but an unexpected jolt of fear. Neither
does Adela's suicide in Bernarda Alba provide a tidy finish; the only thing that her
death accomplishes is to reinforce Bernarda's supremacy. In The Cherry Orchard,
the family lets misfortune overtake them, leaving both the orchard and their oldest
servant to die in their absence. The Three Sisters also ends on an uneasy note. The
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trio of heroines is literally forced out of its home by a dreadful sister-in-law, and all
hope of a happy future is squelched under her power. What troubles us so much in
these plays is the frustration at not seeing a resolution – even a terrible one - to the
most obvious problems: the three sisters will never get to Moscow, Yerma will
never have children, nobody will be able to marry Pepe el Romano and it seems as
though nothing ever really happens.1 Nevertheless, these plays are undeniably
complete, despite their lack of harmony (in comparison to classical theater).
Indeed, where could the action possibly progress from such stifling endings? Where
Greek tragedy's unified wholeness most often arose from the a tragedy of action, in
which the hero fights his destiny tooth and nail before succumbing to it, these
modern tragedies are complete insofar as they are tragedies of inaction. The latter is
far more disquieting, in a sense; although both present insurmountable
conclusions, tragedy of inaction resonates with weakness rather than strength.
I do not mean to imply, of course, that ancient tragedy was not unsettling in
its own right, but it carries with it an implied sense of integrity that modern tragedy
lacks. It is perhaps an issue of characterization that makes its brand of unity so
different from the modern. "Tragedy is a mimesis of men better than ourselves,"
Aristotle explains, but he had a Greek audience in mind (48). He understands that,
if the viewer is to react with both fear and pity at the tragedy unfolding before him,
he must be able to identify with the hero. The Hellenic spectator would not have
been moved by a hero with weakness of character. He can empathize only with
1

This is not the case with all of Lorca's tragic theater, however. Bodas de Sangre, for instance, is
much more traditionally Greek in its execution, in that it is very clearly a tragedy of action and
resolves itself in vengeance and extreme dramatic grandeur.
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somebody deserving of admiration: the type of hero that Aristotle describes, a
noble and virtuous character who succumbs to completely inescapable hamartia.
He would simply not be able to relate to the kind of passive, indecisive
personalities that have riddled modern theater, at least since Hamlet.
Conversely, modern spectators have an entirely different threshold for
empathy. For many of them, tragedy is not a mimesis of men better than they are,
but men who are just like them. The 20th century hero is hardly a hero at all – he
may have any number of shortcomings that result from his own personality flaws,
rather than an insurmountable divine force. This is because his audience requires a
much higher dose of realism than did the Greeks. In an age of intense class struggle
and fragmenting spiritual beliefs, a different archetype must emerge. The modern
spectator may find the fall of an idealized protagonist to be lamentable, but it will
not resonate with him beyond a superficial level. Instead of the adoration that the
Greek spectator might have felt towards this perfect version of himself, his modern
counterpart experiences a sharp realization of insignificance by comparison,
realizing the depth of his own flaws instead of feeling pride for the character meant
to represent him. The hero’s fall must be significant in a different context, one that
makes sense to the intended audiences of Chekhov and Lorca. Teetering on the
brink of revolution or war, the Russian or Spanish audience member would have
felt a greater connection with displaced social classes or other powerless victims of
government overhaul. The Greeks wanted to see a representation of what a Greek
should be, even if they did not find that representation similar to themselves as
individuals. This desire was a side-effect of living in a society built on aristocratic
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ideals and democratic practices, the best parts of which found their artistic
expression in one powerful symbol: the tragic hero. In the same manner, the
modern viewer’s need to connect with less upstanding individuals is, in part, a
response to an unstable socio-political climate.
According to German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, this evolution
of the tragic hero (and, of course, of tragedy itself) began long before the time of
either Chekhov or Lorca. Nietzsche notices the beginning of a shift in tragedy
within Euripides’ writings. Like Aristotle, Nietzsche believes that tragedy's
development had all but ceased with Euripides. However, where Aristotle claims
that Euripides, "whatever other faults of organization he may have, at least makes
the most tragic impression of all poets," Nietzsche blames him for the death of
tragedy (Halliwell 45). He takes great issue with Euripides’ injection of “civic
mediocrity” into a heretofore aristocratic genre (Nietzsche 77). “The mirror in
which formerly only grand and bold traits were represented now showed the
painful fidelity that conscientiously reproduces even the botched outlines of
nature,” he laments, clearly not interested in the possibility of the uneducated
masses finding common ground with the heroes of tragedy (78). As I’ve discussed,
the differences that have appeared in tragedy are necessary for its continued
relevance. Why, then, does Nietzsche view the phenomenon as an abomination to
the tragic form?
Nietzsche’s entire understanding of tragedy is built on the interplay of two
forces: the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Apollonian represents an idealized
dream-state and all that is masculine, civilized and composed, although still open
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to desire, fear and the irrational. The Dionysian, its feminine counterpart, is nature,
the chaotic and decadent power that Apollo tames. It is the sound that
accompanies the Apollonian image. The collision of these two forces gives birth to
tragedy. They signify two "art-states of nature," the Apollonian "image world of
dreams" and the Dionysian "intoxicated reality," which takes the dream-state into
excessive ecstasy that "destroy[s] the individual and redeem[s] him by a mystic
feeling of oneness" (Nietzsche 38). As power constantly shifts from one to the other
- Apollo harnessing Dionysus' wild energy, Dionysus, in turn, tumbling the walls of
order with orgiastic revelry – a sort of ever-undulating structure emerges. "The
Dionysian and the Apollinian [sic], in new births ever following and mutually
augmenting one another, controlled the Hellenic genius," Nietzsche explains (47).
In other words, tragedy is the carnage that results from their melee. Without the
clash of one against the other, it simply would not exist. This is the very foundation
of Nietzsche's problem with Euripides; as he envisions it, Euripides has stripped
Dionysus from tragic theater, leaving in its place a complete mockery of its former
self.
Nietzsche calls this mockery "New Attic Comedy" (76). Instead of Dionysus,
there is a new entity battling the Apollonian: Socrates. As an ever-questioning,
ever-skeptical philosopher and spectator of Euripides' dramas, Socrates tempers the
Apollonian archetype in a completely different manner from Dionysus. Instead of
striking a balance with Apollo, he elbows him in the ribs like a co-conspirator in an
elaborate game. Indeed, the opening that Socrates leaves for the audience of
plebeians to come "onto the stage and … pass judgment on the drama" implies a
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certain tongue-in-cheek understanding that Nietzsche deems wholly un-tragic (79).
Euripides, he insists, gives voice to Socrates' obsession with individuality and
human reason, pushing away Dionysus' artistic and mystical impulses. "The New
Comedy, with its perpetual triumphs of cunning and craftiness," is an open playing
field for Socratic inquiry (78).
Nietzsche contends that the mystery and uncertainty that shrouded
Aeschylean and Sophoclean drama was what made it so powerfully moving as
tragedy. Euripides turns their formula on its head, demanding that every
unexplained detail be illuminated and brought to the spectator's immediate
attention. "Understanding was for him the real root of all enjoyment and creation,"
says Nietzsche, but the result of understanding, the semi-ironic, overly selfreflective philosophical drama that emerged from Euripides' need, killed tragedy
outright, turning it into something "naturalistic and inartistic" (83). This new form
fails to hold its spectators in suspense. Here Nietzsche points to the Euripidean
prologue as evidence; if the playwright lays out the entire plot before it even
occurs, the viewer cannot experience revelation along with the hero. Instead, he
observes the action critically, knowing full well what lies in store and able to draw
his own intellectual conclusions. For Nietzsche, dramatic irony of this kind has no
place in tragic theater.
Nietzsche is incapable of envisioning tragedy's translation into a democratic
form. Whatever bends the rules that he has laid out exceeds the realm of possibility
within tragedy. Apollo and Dionysus wither away when the common man climbs
up on the stage, he believes. In truth, it appears that one of his biggest concerns is
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the lowering of such a high art to the level of the common man. Euripides has
taken an art form that catered to the highest in power and intelligence and
explained all of its mystery in terms that everybody could understand. Thus the
esoteric became commonplace, pandering to "a power whose strength lies solely in
numbers," as Nietzsche so eloquently puts it (79).
It appears that Nietzsche takes the greatest issue with the changing dynamic
between character and spectator. There is a necessary separation between the two
that Euripides and Socrates do not honor. As a result, the spectator can roam about
the play as he pleases, diluting it with his presence. To Nietzsche's mind, the
"ideal spectator" is the tragic chorus, "insofar as it is the only beholder, the beholder
of the visionary world of the scene" (62). This stylized audience is an ideal
complement to the hero, pushing him into self-contemplation in a perfect balance
of Apollonian images (represented by the hero) and Dionysian music (represented
by the chorus) (Nietzsche 62-5). Nietzsche maintains that the lack of this
experience is precisely what pushes Dionysus away, but can we be certain that
Dionysus is really absent from theater? As the representation of intoxication and
excess, an id to Apollo's super ego, Dionysus or Dionysian elements certainly
figure prominently in post-Euripidean drama. Even Euripides himself, the progenitor
of this disgrace to the tragic form, includes quite a bit of it; we need only look to
the most obvious example, The Bacchae, to see how important a role Dionysus
plays. (Of course, Nietzsche backpedals a bit when referencing this play, insisting
that it was a sort of death-bed confession for Euripides, an admission of Dionysus'
inextricability from tragedy.) Returning to the modern theater of Chekhov and
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Lorca, we can see that here, too, the Dionysian influence may not have
disappeared. He has not been replaced by Socratic reasoning but masked by it,
creating a more naturalistic – but hardly inartistic – kind of tragedy that is far
likelier to provoke empathy in a modern audience.
It is quite interesting that Nietzsche notes an air of naturalism in Euripides'
plays. Chekhov, as we know, was at the forefront of European naturalism, and it is
curious to think that the genre may have found its roots in Hellenic Greece.
Nietzsche would undoubtedly argue that Chekhov wrote ironies, not tragedies, and
that his plays lacked the proper art and passion characterized by Dionysus. Still, if
we take a closer look, we see that Dionysian forces are not absent but simply
overshadowed by the tedium and decorum of everyday life. Because Chekhov
writes tragedy of inaction, his plots are often ripe with the tension of characters
who will not or cannot act on their desires. It is when this tension bubbles to the
surface that we can see Dionysus emerge. The Three Sisters, a quiet provincial
drama, builds in tension until it literally bursts into flames in the third act. The
sisters' long-repressed discomfort with their lives and their slow but steady
displacement by a cruel sister-in-law finally reaches its pinnacle, allowing a
Dionysian force to take over. Here, the youngest and most idealistic of the sisters
breaks into absolute hysterics, flanked by the flames of the neighboring house fire
and accompanied by the unrelenting sound of sirens. She is overcome by an
intense and painful passion that, although very uncharacteristic for her, still follows
the plot logically and never strays from the realm of the possible. The fact that the
scene remains fairly realistic and naturalistic makes it all the more powerful to an
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audience full of people who are perfectly capable of imagining such a scene
unfolding in their own town, if not their own homes. Irina's fervor resonates with
all those whose predicaments resemble her own. Similarly, The Seagull's play
within a play acts as a venue for the abstract and symbolic to surface without
tarnishing the believability of the play as a whole. The ominous string-breaking
motif and magic show of The Cherry Orchard are nods to a Dionysian presence, as
well. They form an eerie framing device, a foreshadower of catastrophe that is
rendered all the more poignant by virtue of its realism. Chekhov would not have
achieved the same results with the kind of over-the-top, rapturous surrealism
behind which Nietzsche rallies.
Lorca's tragedies follow classical themes much more closely than
Chekhov's, but we can make very similar observations about Dionysus' role within
them. Lorca's plots are relatively simple and do not seem to occupy a particular
point in time, but they are not unrealistic. The pagan procession in the final act of
Yerma lets Dionysus enter the proceedings without disturbing the believability of
the action. Lorca takes great liberties with this scene, however, and the ritual-like
dancing and singing that it involves is particularly reminiscent of the cultish,
Dionysian carousing that we associate with ancient drama. The scene climaxes
with Yerma's fit of rage, in which she murders her husband – certainly not a
moment of clarity or self-awareness for our heroine, although it is rife with irony.
As a post-Romantic who puts himself and his cultural identity into his heroes,
Lorca's literary devices are especially well suited for bringing the spectator into
identifying with the play. His use of mythic archetypes, such as the macho and
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hembra that I have mentioned previously, resonates with the spectators of his
specific time and place by playing to their collective tradition as well as to their
individual selves. But in the cases of both Chekhov and Lorca, Dionysian ardor
remains; it must simply be framed by logic in order to fit its proper context.
The difference between old and new styles of tragedy lies in the goal of the
drama. Instead of inciting the intense feeling of oneness with man and nature in the
manner of Nietzsche's ideal tragedy, it now forces the viewer into self-analysis
through the characters. Although Nietzsche insists that art holds "the joyous hope
that the spell of individuation may be broken in augury of a restored oneness", the
shift towards a more individualized view of both characters and audience members
reflects the needs of an ever-changing public (74). Just as the tragic hero must be
updated for the modern stage, so must the tragic form.
In essence, Nietzsche's dissatisfaction with the individuation and "dumbing
down" of tragedy does not actually prove a lack of a Dionysian presence, which,
by his definition, lies at the heart of all tragic theater. Dionysus remains on the
tragic stage, but he is no longer the mass hypnotist that he used to be. Modern
audiences will not suspend their disbelief long enough to feel a real connection
with the tragedy they are watching. He peeks through the cracks in the veneer of
Chekhov's naturalism. He shows himself prominently in Lorca, but only in
culturally appropriate and believable settings. In this way, the mystery and chaos
that balances out logic and reason continues to fulfill its duty to tragedy, but within
a proper context for the time in which the play was written.
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Shifting to New Secular Gods – The Internalization of Tragic Fate
Modern theater can overcome the hurdles of Aristotle's and Nietzsche's
rules with some ease, but there still remains the issue of Steiner. There is room for
interpretation where the two previously-discussed authors are concerned, but
Steiner's argument is not only steadfast and direct in its logic, but also far more
appropriate to the discussion of modern theater, as it is the most recently written of
the three and has the benefit of a retrospective clarity. If this beast cannot be slain,
then modern tragedy is doomed to be nothing more than "near-tragedy," as Steiner
himself puts it.
In his introduction to a recent translation of Lorca’s plays, Christopher
Maurer explains that, for Lorca, “tragedy entails certain formal elements, … but
above all it involves creating an illusion of fate or destiny, of ‘necessariness’
(Dewell xix, emphasis mine). This particular distinction – that is, illusion of fate
versus actual fate – is precisely what George Steiner clings to. Whether the illusion
appears in Lorca, Chekhov or any other post-Hellenic playwright, it will never
cross the boundary into real tragic fate, without which a drama cannot be a
tragedy. “In tragedy, there are no temporal remedies,” Steiner stresses; “Tragedy
speaks not of secular dilemmas which may be resolved by rational innovation, but
of the unfaltering bias toward inhumanity and destruction in the drift of the world”
(291). This sentiment is not unlike Nietzsche’s displeasure with Dionysus’ exit from
the tragic stage. Socratic realism displaced Dionysian chaos in Euripides’ theater,
leaving its descendants with a similar void. For Steiner, logic and tragedy cannot
coexist; logic “cures” tragedy by offering solutions to tragic problems. “Tragedy can
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occur only where reality has not been harnessed by reason and social
consciousness” for this very reason, because it “is an expression of the pre-rational
phase in history … founded on the assumption that there are in nature and in the
psyche occult, uncontrollable forces able to madden or destroy the mind” (342).
Though his phrasing seems deliberately inclusive, Steiner is actually quite limited
in his intentions. He means specifically that modern tragedy is godless, and
“tragedy is that form of art which requires the intolerable burden of God’s
presence” (353). God cannot be reasoned away, but if he is never there to begin
with, reason has ample opportunity to wreak its tragedy-destroying havoc.
Here we must return to the initial question. Does the lack of gods and
consequent increase in logic necessarily imply escapable fate? This is not a
universally applicable phenomenon. Tragedy can and does exist in the absence of
divine law and intervention. Certainly reason was not absent even when the gods
were front and center – Oedipus, we recall, had been very logical indeed in his
attempts to evade his own oracle-prophesied fate. That his logic led him right into
the lap of a tragic ending, Steiner would argue, was because the gods were there to
squelch it. Yet modern, secular drama may offer just as little escape for its
protagonists. Just because a solution might exist in theory does not imply that it
could exist practically. If this were the case, then we would not be horrified but
merely frustrated by our modern tragic heroes; it would mean that, for whatever
reason, they opt to leave their problems unsolved. What pity could we have for the
three sisters if their failure to reach Moscow came from laziness? How could we
sympathize with Adela if she had had the option of eloping with Pepe el Romano?
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A more menacing force must be at work here. Something must be taking the place
of deities in the allocation of personal destinies, something that both resonates with
the spectator and keeps the play’s hero trapped in his fate.
Pedro Chumillas, who introduces a collection of Lorca’s plays, agrees with
this concept. He suggests that “el amor, en el teatro de Lorca, es un personaje
omnipresente y terrible, un dios clásico enemigo de los mortales, a los que
enardece y a la vez destruye” (23).2 This is hardly unreasonable; love is such a
prevalent motif in Lorca’s works that it can very well form the barrier that keeps his
heroes away from logic. Yerma’s intense love for Victor and for the child she
cannot have ignites her, as Chumillas says, into such an irrational frenzy that she
kills her husband. Adela, for her part, is so consumed by love for Pepe el Romano
that she takes her own life moments after Bernarda lies to her about his death. Love
brings about a tragic ending for both of these heroines and keeps them trapped
inside an inescapable fate. It does not, however, function in the same manner in
Chekhov’s plays, where Lorca’s brand of pure, simple love does not exist. Perhaps
we should cast the net further to find a god-like power that applies to both authors.
Maurer introduces the concept of society as fate-creator, but stops just short
of pushing the idea to the next level. In all of Lorca’s tragic theater, he says, “desire
is frustrated violently and fatally by social forces” (xxii). This does not seem to be
entirely factual, however, as Lorca never fails to include a character or two who
live their lives against the proverbial grain. Maurer does realize that “Lorca’s

2

Love, in Lorca’s theater, is an omnipresent and terrible character, a classical enemy god who
sets mortals aflame and, at the same time, destroys them.
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characters are unhappy and tragic, not because society keeps them from attaining
their object or reaching their destination, but because they cannot fully understand
what it is they want” – but this is only half of the story (xxiii). Social forces do
indeed help to seal the characters into their fate, but society can do nothing to a
person who resists its authority. It is the internal psychology of an individual that
renders him completely incapable of remedying his tragic situation. Social mores
simply plant the seed that has the potential to grow into self-created boundaries in
a person’s mind.
The theme of fallen nobility that pervades both Chekhov and Lorca's works
is an excellent example of the power that society's standards hold over the human
psyche. Nobody better represents the battle for appearances better than the
penniless aristocracy of Chekhov’s plays. His characters may be educated,
intelligent and well-bred, but they are no longer aristocrats. They have been robbed
of their inheritance (the family house in The Three Sisters) or their livelihood (the
cherry orchard), but in either case they are left without the slightest vestige of their
halcyon days of wealth. Still, they cling to the past relentlessly, unable to come to
grips with their new place in society. When Lopakhin suggests cutting down the
cherry orchard, Ranevskaya only scoffs in response. "My dear, forgive me, but you
don't know what you're talking about," she condescends. "If there's anything at all
in this whole district that's still exciting, even incredible, that one thing is our
cherry orchard" (Bristow 173). Although Lopakhin correctly points out that the
orchard lost its usefulness long before, Ranevskaya is blind to his reason.
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What keeps Ranevskaya and other Chekhovian characters from reconciling
with their fate and, as Steiner suggests, remedying the problems in their lives is the
obsessive need to preserve their former societal clout. The pressure of a shifting
society has displaced them and rendered them – like the cherry orchard – useless.
Keeping up appearances is so consuming for them that it clouds their minds. Their
denial and deluded sense of worth are powerful tools for self-entrapment that
preclude any possibility of improving their situation. Admitting uselessness even to
themselves would be ruinous, and they are entirely incapable of it – the mere
suggestion rolls off their backs.
Bernarda Alba may be the only one of Lorca's plays that uses this theme, but
it provides a more than adequate example of the harmful influence of aristocratic
delusions. To begin with, the family in question is no longer wealthy. As matriarch
of the house, Bernarda maintains a false sense of worth. She “tirana todos los que
la rodean”3 by refusing to let them out of her sight (Chumillas 152). Her iron rule
masks a desperation to maintain a moral and respectable order within the realm of
her jurisdiction (quite small, coincidentally, but this partially explains her obsession
with keeping her family from leaving her home). She rules over her home as though
it were a highly fortified kingdom, forbidding entrance or exit through its borders. It
is the only tangible vestige of her former glory, and she must salvage it for fear of
losing status entirely.
A seemingly tangential dialogue between Bernarda and Poncia, her maid,
reveals the thick border that Bernarda has drawn around her micro-society:
3

tyrannizes all those around her
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Poncia: Hablaban de Paca la Roseta. Anoche ataron a su marido a un
pesebre y a ella se la llevaron a la grupa del caballo hast lo alto del olivar.
Bernarda: ¿Y ella?
Poncia: Ella tan conforme. Dicen que iba con los pechos fuera y
Maximiliano la llevaba cogida como si tocara la guitarra. ¡Un horror!
Bernarda: ¿Y qué pasó?
Poncia: Lo que tenía que pasar. Volvieron casi de día. Paca la Roseta traía
el pelo suelto y una corona de flores en la cabeza.
Bernarda: Es la única mujer mala que tenemos en el pueblo.
Poncia: Porque no es de aquí. Es de muy lejos. Y los que fueron con ella
son también hijos de forasteros. Los hombres de aquí no son capaces de
eso (162).4

It is plain to see from this passage that there is a clear boundary between those
bound to society's standards and those who are not. Paca la Roseta is "de muy
lejos," far from the clutches of either Bernarda or the rules to which Bernarda so
stringently adheres. What is more, we can see the effect that a lack of restraint has
on people; although Bernarda and Poncia discuss Paca with disdain, it is
nonetheless obvious that she is infinitely happier with her lot in life than the closely
watched daughters of Bernarda Alba. She is unrestricted even by clothing, sexually
free and completely shameless. Poncia calls Paca's people "forasteros," indicating
4

Poncia: They were talking about Paca la Roseta. Last night they tied her husband up in a stall
and carried her to the top of the olive grove on the back of a horse.
Bernarda: And her?
Poncia: She went along with it. They say that she rode with her breasts out and Maximiliano
grasped her like he was playing a guitar. Horrible!
Bernarda: And what happened?
Poncia: What had to happen. They returned almost by morning. Paca la Roseta's hair was undone
and had a crown of flowers on her head.
Bernarda: She is the only bad woman we have in this town.
Poncia: Because she isn't from here. She's from very far away. And those who came with her are
also sons of outsiders. The men from here aren't capable of these things.
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an almost barbaric world of outsiders who cannot be controlled by Bernarda's
civilizing force. Bernarda's house is a stagnant fortress of propriety. Inside, the girls
are barely allowed to move around. Bernarda's senile mother, the only resident of
the house who refuses to conform, is kept locked away in her room so as to stifle
her rebellion. As Chumillas states, "el triunfo de Bernarda consiste en negar la
realidad" (209).5 So consuming is her need for wealth and respectability that she is
willing to go to preposterous lengths to achieve it.
But it is not Bernarda who meets a tragic end. If anybody can be considered
a tragic hero in this play, it is Adela, Bernarda's youngest and most rebellious
daughter. It appears from the outset that Adela is the only sister who is capable of
overcoming Bernarda's tyranny, but we soon realize that even she is not immune.
After revealing her love for Pepe el Romano, the man promised to her oldest (and
richest) sister, Adela announces to her mother that "en [ella] no manda nadie más
que Pepe" (207).6 Nevertheless, it is Bernarda's command that pushes her over the
edge. As the matriarch leaves for the barn to find Pepe, Adela hears a gunshot and
flees the scene in anguish. The family finds her dead in her room moments later;
she could not bear to live without her lover.
The horrible irony of the situation is that Bernarda never actually shot Pepe
– he ran away unscathed. Still, Bernarda's power is so strong that Adela never
hesitates in her decision. In a sense, her suicide fulfills Bernarda's wishes. "!Mi hija
ha muerto virgen!"5 she cries, declaring once and for all that her daughter's identity
3

Bernarda's triumph consists of the negation of reality.
Nobody commands[her] except Pepe.
5
My daughter has died a virgin!
4
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was not her own (209). For Adela, Bernarda takes on the role of God. She may
believe that she can subvert her mother's will, but in the end she must submit to
her whims. Thus, Bernarda's delusions of worth permeate the entire household,
trapping her daughters both physically and mentally. Even when escape seems
possible, death precludes it – Adela could not have run off with Pepe because her
mother's hold over her rendered her completely helpless.
Surprisingly, Chekhov's Three Sisters shares many structural elements with
Bernarda. As with the Alba sisters, the father has recently died, the family is left
without the riches it used to have and the house has become a similar fortress-like
symbol of inertia. A mother-figure is not present until Andrey, the sisters' older
brother, marries Natasha, who soon takes on the role of tyrannical matriarch. She,
too, has fabricated a life of status and nobility for herself, although, as Masha points
out early on, she is very much of a lower class. As Natasha rises to power, we
begin to see two distinct types of self-denial: Natasha creates her own aristocratic
status by leeching off those around her, while the sisters cling to their formerly
wealthy selves, refusing to adapt to their new roles – so much so that Natasha is
able literally to pull the rug from beneath their feet. Where Bernarda trapped her
family inside the house, Natasha pushes them out, displacing all but her husband
from their own childhood home. Her total absorbtion with taking over the family
looms over her weak and unhappy sisters-in-law, who no longer have any legal
rights to the house. Natasha's word is unbreakable, and thus she too takes on a
godly role.
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The sisters themselves avoid reality by shifting their focus into the future,
one that they hope will be bright and promising. If they can only go to Moscow,
they would be revived. Irina, like Adela, is both the youngest and most motivated
daughter, harboring the highest hopes of fleeing her wretched situation. As such,
she presents the most exaggerated example of how the sisters cannot avoid their
tragic fate, however they may try. Irina embodies the desire to escape. Her pitiful
and oft-repeated cries of "  !   !"7 reveal an earnest and naive belief
that the family can begin anew. She understands that she must work now to
support herself and save money, but her efforts are spoiled by her own
dissatisfaction. After a hard day at work, she complains to her sisters: " 
  

 ,      .      ,     ,

 –       .    ,    …" (Berdnikov 136).8 It is
impossible for her to look past her educated upbringing, where the thought of work
without intellectual stimulation is madenning. Still, she pushes onward, all for the
sake of Moscow. Later, she agrees to marry the Baron Tuzenbakh for the same
reason, although she does not love him. In the end, Tuzenbakh is shot in a duel
and Irina is lost once more. Steiner may insist that remedies are available, that all
could be resolved happily if only the characters could overcome the tragedy of
inaction and move away. But Irina does everything in her power to repair her life –
fate is what draws her back in.

7

To Moscow! To Moscow!
I will have to look for a different job, as this one doesn't suit me. Everything that I wanted,
everything that I dreamed about – that's exactly what it doesn't have. Work without poetry,
without thought…
8
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It is painfully evident that the Sergeevna sisters will never make it to
Moscow. Irina's attempts at sacrifice mimic similar sacrifices on the parts of Masha
and Olga. Irina is a mash-up of everything that went wrong in the lives of her older
sisters. Olga is a teacher, a spinster at twenty-eight. She feels old from work, and
although she is grateful that she can provide for the family, she still believes that
"   [ ]            

,   

 "

(119).9 Her opposite is Masha, who has not worked a day in her life, but dutifully
married the school director - a man whose affections she does not reciprocate. The
melancholy that she feels in a loveless marriage drives her into the arms of another,
but any attempt at a viable relationship with him is futile. Irina seems to repeat her
sisters' mistakes in double-time, trying Olga's route first before slipping into
Masha's. Predictably, the effects are disastrous. The failures of the first two predict
the failure of the third. Moscow – and the escape from dissatisfaction that it
symbolizes – is unattainable. It is the sisters' own internalized sense of the socially
and morally acceptable that drives the nail into their coffins; they are too firmly
entrenched within their values to change, and so their fate is sealed.
But delusion comes in many forms, not just in the recalcitrance to admit an
undesirable social status. Yerma shows us how social expectations can affect a hero
in an entirely different way. Yerma (whose name, quite carefully chosen, means
"barren" in Spanish) is a young wife living in the campo of southern Spain, married
for several years but still childless. Her most profound desire is to have a baby, but
she has not been able to. Again, Steiner could easily point out the obvious
9

If [she] had married and sat home all day, that would have been better.
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solutions – solutions that are even offered to her – but none of them turns out to be
actually feasible.
Yerma admits to the old woman who crosses paths with her in the first act
that she does not have sexual feelings for her husband, Juan. In response, the
woman pinpoints this as the most likely reason that she has not been able to
conceive:
Vieja: …Los hombres tienen que gustar, muchacha. Han de deshacernos
las trenzas y darnos de beber agua en su misma boca. Así corre el mundo.
Yerma: El tuyo; que el mío, no. Yo pienso muchas cosas, muchas, y estoy
segura que las cosas que pienso ha de realizar mi hijo. Yo me entregué a
mi marido por él, y me sigo entregando para ver si llega, pero nunca por
divertirme.
Vieja: ¡Y resulta que estás vacía! (Yebra 64)10

For Yerma, a humble, proper woman who maintains a child-like trust in God,
sexual pleasure would only mar the purity of conception. Still, the possibility of
fulfilling love does exist for her, and thus, we must assume, the hope of bearing a
child. Her childhood love, Víctor, still works in her town and continues to pursue a
very flirtatious relationship with her. If she were to accept him, she would be able
to have children, but in her mind the situation is far more complicated. Yerma's
sense of obligation to both her society and her family is incredibly strong. It would

10

Old Woman: …Men should be enjoyed, my girl. They have to undo our braids and give us
water to drink from their own mouths. This is how the world works.
Yerma: Yours, not mine. I dream about many things, very many, and I am certain that the things I
dream about will all be realized when I have my son. I submitted myself to my husband for his
sake, and I continue to submit myself to my husband to see whether he will arrive, but never to
enjoy myself.
Old Woman: And the result is that you are empty!
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be unthinkable to dishonor both her husband and her father – who arranged the
union – in one disastrous move. She adheres to standards and expectations so
firmly that she is locked into complacency.
Neither is the prospect of adoption or caring for others' children an
appropriate compromise for Yerma. "No quiero cuidar hijos de otros," she says to
Juan, "Me figuro que se me van a helar los brazos de tenerlos" (84).11 Not only
does she feel that having a child of her own is her duty as a good Catholic woman,
but the pain of caring for others' without having her own would be too much for
her to bear. Knowing this about her values, that family or society has damaged her
psychologically and made her so stubborn, makes it easier for us to understand
how she has managed to create her own fate from the inside. Her end is not unlike
Adela's, an act of passion that overtakes all reason. In the final moments of the
play, she publicly murders her husband, cementing herself into the destiny that she
herself created:
Yerma: … Marchita, marchita, pero segura. Ahora sí que lo sé de cierto. Y
sola. (Se levanta. Empieza a llegar gente.) Voy a descansar sin despertarme
sobresaltada, para ver si la sangre me anuncia otra sangre nueva. Con el
cuerpo seco para simpre. ¿Que queréis saber? ¡No os acerquéis, porque he
matado a mi hijo, yo misma he matado a mi hijo! (119)12

11

I do not want to take care of other people's children. I imagine that my arms will freeze just
from holding them.
12
Yerma: … Barren, barren but certain. Now I know it for certain. And I am alone. (She stands.
People begin to arrive.) I will sleep without waking up surprised, seeing whether my blood has
announced other, new blood. With my body dry forever. What do you want to know? Don't come
near me, because I have killed my son, I have killed my own son!
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A baby could only come from her husband, but without love, she could never
conceive with him. In a final surrender to her fate, she kills any hope for a son. She
has externalized what she had always known to be true inside of her.

Steiner holds firmly that "the ancient is not a glove into which the modern
can slip at will" (325). There is no question that the two are two very distinct types
of theater that are neither interchangeable nor meant to be so. But to insist that "no
mythology created in the age of rational empiricism matches the antique in tragic
power" is simply unfair (ibid). The rational approach to tragedy reflects a postFreudian era of religious and psychological questioning that simply turns tragedy
back in on itself. Chekhov and Lorca were themselves the products of this age; their
own dissatisfaction with religion and spirituality stood as a testament to the waning
optimism of their cultures. The magnanimity and sincerity of Greek theater is
entirely inappropriate to a society where political duplicity and shattered faith were
the norm. This new audience requires irony and realism in order to feel a
connection to tragedy, and this necessitates the absence of obvious gods.
Whether it is love, society or any other catalyst for psychological paralysis,
the result is the same: the tragic heroes of modern drama have locked themselves
into their own mental turmoil, internalizing the fate that, in ancient times, came
from outside of themselves. Not only is the presence of gods irrelevant to the
transformed tragic theater of the 20th century, but it is very difficult to fit into a
world where, although faith plays a large role in many lives, gods do not actually
interact with mortals. Manmade destiny does not necessarily imply that it can be
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controlled; it my be the hero's own doing, but he is just as powerless to escape it as
if the gods themselves had damned him. In yet another example of tragedy's
adaptation into a modern frame of reference, psychological turmoil replaces the
need for the divine. We have swallowed the gods and allowed them to rule us from
within.
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